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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the newspaper or newspapers specified therein have been determined
from the application and examination required by law to be that or
those most likely to give notice to the person to be served. Provided;
that if it be shown that such statement did not appear in said order,
or that the information given in the application and examination re-
quired by the immediately preceding section was so false and mis-
leading as to cause the newspaper or newspapers specified not to be
that or those most likely to give notice to the person to be served, or
that from the information given in such application and examination
the newspaper or newspapers specified could not reasonably have been
determined to be those most likely to give such notice, then the service
of summons is to be void and of no effect.20
J. DICKSON PHILLIPs, JR.
Evidence-Opinion Rule-Estimate of Speed from Mark on Road
In Tyndall v. Hines Co.1 plaintiff was struck by defendant's truck
while walking on the shoulder of the road. A highway patrolman testi-
fied as to the presence of marks on the grass and shoulder. He testified
that they were not brake marks, but were marks made when the truck
made a sudden turn, thus shifting the weight to one side or the other.
The trial court allowed him to give his opinion as to tle speed of the
vehicle, based upon such physical data. On appeal, questioning the
admissibility of the evidence and alleging its admission was prejudicial
to the defendant, the Supreme Court Held: That the witness not having
seen the truck in motion would not be permitted to give an opinion as
to its speed. "The opinion must be of facts observed. The witness
must speak of facts within his knowledge. He cannot under the guise
of an opinion give his deductive conclusion from what he saw and
knew.'  Finding the evidence prejudicial, the court awarded the de-
fendant a new trial.
Instances where the court will allow the witness to express himself
in terms of inferences drawn from facts observed may be divided in
two classes, which are subject to separate and distinct rules of admis-
sibility: (1) Where the witness is specially qualified and by virtue of
such may aid the jury. (2) Where the witness is unable otherwise to
present the facts to the jury.3 The former which is most commonly
characterized as expert opinion is received because the witness' skill in
"' The provisions for length and cost of publication could be inserted after the
portion set out above.
* 226 N. C. 620, 39 S. E. (2d) 828 (1940).
* Id. at 623, 39 S. E. (2d) at 830.
* It is recognized that these classifications are but broad general divisions of
admissible opinion, and that there are some admissible opinions that cannot be easily
)laced in one or the other class but exist in the twilight zone of both.
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drawing the proper inference from the observed or assumed facts is
greater than the jury's; while the latter is a rule of necessity or con-
venience adopted to provide for the situation where the facts cannot be
so told by the witness as to make the jury as able as he to draw the
proper inference.4
Though the opinion is one that is inadmissible from a witness not
specially qualified, if it be proper from one who is, an objection that
the witness is not specially qualified must be taken at the trial;5 and
when this is not done it is too late upon appeal to object that the witness
did not qualify as an expert.6 Whether a particular witness is an expert
or not is a preliminary question of fact to be determined by the court
below.7 That once determined, as it necessarily is determined, if the
testimony is admitted, the appellate court ordinarily accepts the lower
court's determination. 8 It follows that where an opinion is admitted
without objection as to the special qualifications of the witness the
appellate court should test the competency of the evidence according to
the rules applicable to both classes of opinion mentioned above.
Was the opinion in the principal case competent because the witness
was unable otherwise to present the facts to the jury? The observation
by the court that: "He (the witness) gave a plain, clear, and distinct
description of, the signs, marks, and conditions he found at the scene
of the collision so that ordinary jurymen could readily understand and
appreciate just what he saw," would indicate the statement as to the
speed of the truck, based upon these observations, was not admissible
as this class of opinion. The opinion here was not a substitute method
of presenting the facts observed, but was an inference or conclusion
drawn from them.
Was the evidence competent as expert opinion? The failure to
state the question calling for the opinion in hypothetical form would
not be objectionable, where the expert is speaking from personal ob-
servations.9 Since the requirement that the witness be shown to be better
'WIGMOan, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§557, 1917; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVImENCE (1946 ed.) §132.
5 Summerlin v. Railroad, 133 N. C. 550, 45 S. E. 898 (1903) ; Britt v. North
Carolina R. R., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908) ; but see Bivings v. Gosnell, 141
N. C. 341, 53 S. E. 861 (1906).
6 State v. Corriher, 196 N. C. 397, 145 S. E. 773 (1928) ; Ramsey v. Standard
Oil Co., 186 N. C. 739, 120 S. E. 331 (1923); Vann v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
182 N. C. 567, 109 S. E. 556 (1921).
7LaVecchia v. Land Bank, 218 N. C. 35, 9 S. E. (2d) 489 (1940); State v.
Cafer, 205 N. C. 653, 172 S. E. 176 (1934) ; State v. Combs, 200 N. C. 671 158
S. E. 252 (1931); State v. Cole, 94 N. C. 958 (1886). But cf. Pridgen r. Gibson,
194 N. C. 289, 139 S. E. 443 (1927) (a finding by the trial court as a matter of law
that a witness was not an expert was reviewed and reversed).
' State v. Gray, 180 N. C. 697, 104 S. E. 647 (1920) ; Jones v. Norfolk Southern
R. R., 176 N. C. 260, 97 S. E. 48 (1916) ; Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
151 N. C. 217, 65 S. E. 920 (1909).
'Dulin v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C. 638, 135 S. E. 614, 49 A. L. R. 663
(1926) ; WIGmopE, EvmENcE (3rd ed. 1940) §675; Anno 82 A. L. R. 1338 (1931).
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qualified than the jury to draw such an inference had been waived in
the principal case, the answer to the above question should depend on
whether any inference stronger than a remote speculative guess could
be drawn from the observed facts.10 Notwithstanding his qualifications,
even the expert must base his opinion upon data adequate to authorize
an opinion." The principle is well established that when an expert
gives an opinion based upon supposed facts the facts assumed must be
legally sufficient to support the opinion.' 2 The principle should be
equally applicable when the opinion is based on the personal observa-
tions of the witness.13 Most courts recognize that an expert can base
an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle upon the length of brake skid
marks, if given the weight of the vehicle, condition of the tires and
other physical conditions.14 Similarly experts given the weight, speed,
conditions of the road, and other pertinent physical conditions have been
allowed to state an opinion as to the distance within which a vehicle
could have been stopped.15 Generally the courts have refused to allow
10Everart v. Fischer, 75 Ore. 321, 147 Pac. 189 (1915); Reall v. Deirizzi, 127
W. Va. 662, 34 S. E. (2d) 253 (1945) ; WIGMopm, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §959;
compare McCarthy v. Souther, 83 N. H. 29, 137 AtI. 445 (1927) (fact that impact
broke handle on door basis for opinion of speed).
I Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. (2d) 715 (1942) (proper to exclude
opinion based upon two patrolmen's observations after the collision).
", Hobbs v. Union Pacific R. R., 62 Idaho 58, 108 P. (2d) 841 (1940) (error to
admit an opinion of an expert as to the speed of a train based alone on the distance
it had traveled after the collision) ; Bazeman v. State, 177 Md. 151, 9 A. (2d) 60
(1940) (error to admit opinion as to possible stopping of car, without stating con-
dition of tires, surface of road, etc.) ; Bryant v. Stone, 178 N. C. 291, 100 S. E.
578 (1919) (proper to exclude opinion as to cause of boat overturning based upon
appearances next morning) ; Thomas v. Inland Motor Freight Co., 190 Wash. 428,
68 P. (2d) 603 (1937) (error to admit opinion that truck with adequate braking
power could have slowed sufficiently to have rounded curve, when the speed of the
truck was not shown); Boyd v. Virginian Ry., 123 W. Va. 47, 13 S. E. (2d) 273
(1941) (error to admit opinion as to possible stopping distance of train without
including speed as a part of the basic data).
"Union Bus Lines v. Maulder, 180 S. W. (2d) 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
(error to admit opinion of speed based alone on damaged condition of vehicles) ;
Hobbs v. Union Pacific R. R., cited supra note 12; Bryant v. Stone, cited supra
note 12; Shams v. Saportas, cited supra note 11.
"Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 66 So. 469 (1920); McKenney v. Winter-
steen, 122 Neb. 679, 241 N. W. 112 (1932) (expert had specially qualified himself
by experiments under the same physical conditions). Contra: Young v. Swartz, 34
N. E. (2d) 795 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1941) ; Heidner v. Germschied, 41 S. D. 439, 171
N. W. 208 (1919) (witness was allowed to state opinion after he was shown to
know the kind of car, condition of roadbed, and length of skid mark) ; Rankin v.
Hughes, 161 S. W. (2d) 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Luethe v. Schmidt-Gaertner
Co., 170 Wis. 590, 176 N. W. 63 (1920). In Savadow v. Keystone Transportation
Co., 241 App. Div. 161,271 N.Y. Supp. 293 (1934) the court held it reversible error
to exclude expert opinion that skid marks of length shown could not have been
made except by car exceeding the legal speed limit. Compare Cheek v. Brokerage
Co., 209 N. C. 569, 183 S. E. 729 (1936) where an opinion as to which side of the
center line an accident occurred based upon data observed after the collision was
excluded because it invaded the province df the jury.
" This is but an application of the same principle with variables and unknowns
changed. Berkowitz v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 215 Pac. 675
(1923) ; Birdsong v. Meyers, 141 Kan. 140, 40 P. (2d) 430 (1935) ; State v. Gray,
180 N. C. 697, 104 S. E. 647 (1920).
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a witness to give an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle based alone on
its sound in motion,1 6 or the sound of a collision.' 7 However, the Mis-
souri court has held it proper to allow an expert to give an opinion as
to the speed of an automobile based upon such data.'8
No general determination can be made as to the minimum sufficiency
of data necessary to support an opinion. This question must be passed
upon first by the trial court in the light of the circumstances of each
case and is reviewable as a question of law. No case has been found
which upholds the admissibility of an opinion based upon data so scant
as that in the principal case.
Sometime in the future there may be developed a scientific technique
which can provide a method for the estimation of speed based upon data
even as meager as that used in the principal case. When this is done it
will be time enough to re-examine the rule of evidence which now
excludes such estimations.
CyRus F. LE.
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Suits Instituted in State Courts
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, hereinafter abbre-
viated as F. L. S. A., provides that employee suits for the recovery of
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation "may be maintained
in any court of competent jurisdiction."' Section 24(8) of the Judicial
Code provides that regardless of diversity of citizenship or the sum in
controversy the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
over "all suits ... arising under any law regulating commerce." 2  Sec-
tion 28 of the Judicial Code provides that "Any suit of a civil nature
... arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States... of
which the district courts of the United States are given original juris-
diction ... may be removed by the defendant... to the district courts."8
In Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand4 plaintiff employee brought
action to recover alleged overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the F. L. S. A. Action was
removed from the state court in which it was commenced. Plaintiff
moves to remand on ground that Congress intended to amend the Re-
" Law v. Gallegher, 9 Harr. (Del.) 189, 197 At. 479 (1938); Challinor v.
Axton, 246 Ky. 76, 54 S. W. (2d) 600 (1932) ; Park v. Gandio, 286 Mich. 133, 281
N. W. 565 (1935) ; Lambach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 Ad. 88 (1925).
17 Knache v. Pease Seed and Grain Co., 134 Neb. 130, 277 N. W. 798 (1938);
Mierendorf v. Soalfeld, 138 Neb. 876, 295 N. W. 901 (1941).8 Murphy v. Cole. 338 Mo. 13, 88 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1935).
152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
236 STAT. 1092 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(8).
'36 STAT. 1094 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
'65 F. Supp. 940 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
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